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Abstract. The authors consider the ongoing development of local human 
civilizations in the neighboring regions to Russia (Europe, the Islamic world, 
and the Pacific Rim). This issue is analyzed through the proliferation of norms 
within the system of international relations, a key process in guaranteeing 
international stability. The authors conclude that the speed of norm 
proliferation in international relations in the twenty-first century will be 
hampered by a number of factors. First, the dynamics of European and 
American development indicate a clear decrease in unifying potential as a 
result of Western influence on other civilizations. Second, the study of the 
development of Islamic civilization indicates a significant potential for rejection 
of norm unification. Third, analysis of Pacific Rim civilizations demonstrates 
that economic development of this region is accompanied by a set of 
alternative cultural norms to the Eurocentric world.  
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УДК 327 
 
ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИОННОЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ  
ПРОБЛЕМЫ РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЯ НОРМ  
В СИСТЕМЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ 
 
Аннотация. В работе прогнозируются общие характеристики развития 
человеческих цивилизаций в регионах мира, сопредельных России 
(Европа, исламский мир, АТР). Данная проблема анализируется в 
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контексте вопроса о распространении норм в рамках системы 
международных отношений – процесса, играющего ключевую роль с 
точки зрения обеспечения устойчивости данной системы. В работе 
делается вывод, что скорость распространения норм в системе 
международных отношений в XXI-м веке будет умеряться целым рядом 
факторов.  Во-первых, анализ динамики развития Европы и США 
показывает очевидное снижение унифицирующего потенциала, 
возникающего за счет влияния западного мира на другие локальные 
человеческие цивилизации. Во-вторых, изучение развития исламской 
локальной человеческой цивилизации показывает наличествующий в 
ее рамках серьезный потенциал неприятия унификации норм в рамках 
системы международных отношений. В-третьих, анализ группы 
локальных человеческих цивилизаций, существующих в регионе АТР 
показывает, что экономический подъем данного региона приводит к 
формированию представлений о наличии культурно-цивилизационных 
норм, альтернативных европоцентристскому миру.  
 
Ключевые слова: локальная человеческая цивилизация, устойчивость 
системы международных отношений, распространение и унификация 
норм, западный мир, исламский мир, АТР. 
 
 
The proliferation of norms in international relations is a key factor in 
international stability. Stability, in turn, is a crucial practical issue from 
the standpoint of state security in the modern world in general, and Russia 
in particular (Kuznetsov, Sergeev 2008). This research has become a key 
issue within the Long-term Forecasting of International Relations Program 
developed by the Center for Military and Political Studies at Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) under  
A. I. Podberezkin.  
Civilization diversity, in particular of local human civilizations, is an 
important “inhibitor” of the norm unification process in international 
relations. Thus, unification and stability show a complex dialectical nexus: 
an overly high degree of unification may reduce the system’s resistance to 
shock, which can hit all its components simultaneously; an overly low 
degree of unification tends to reduce the rate of economic integration, 
arouse rapport issues, and escalate conflicts within the system. The 
analysis of such issues has relevance for current scholarly trends in 
political science, international relations studies, and complex norm 
proliferation and innovation studies (Kazantsev 2001; 2003; 2007). 
This article examines the ongoing development of three key 
civilizations that border Russia, namely, the Western civilization, the 
Islamic world, and the Pacific Rim. This analysis will allow for a 
preliminary prediction of the degree of international relations system 
unification on the Russian periphery and of the prospects for norm 
proliferation in long-term planning. 
 
Leonid Iu. Gusev, Andrey A. Kazantsev. The Evolution of Local Human Civilizations… 
 
180 
Western civilization in the twenty-first century: developmental 
prospects 
Generally speaking, what is now referred to as the “Western world” 
implies a well-defined developmental model. Its ideology and system of 
values combine the following principles: a) priority of individual rights over 
social groups (human rights); b) competitive political system with free 
elections as the only legitimate form of political government (democracy); c) 
distribution of resources through the free market as the only efficient 
economical model (market economy);and d) priority of the aforementioned 
principles over national legislation (limited sovereignty). Some have even 
suggested that the nation-state will disappear under the influence of global 
communication systems (Negroponte 1995, 243). In practice, the Western 
world is also marked by American military and political leadership.   
Critically, these aforementioned principles, as well as the attempts to 
enact them worldwide, contain potential internal contradictions. 
Democracy, understood as the unlimited domination of a majority over a 
minority, may contradict the idea of human rights. Similarly, the equality 
implied by democracy and human rights contradicts the inequality implied 
by a market economy. In reality, international interference is often 
achieved through double standards, endorsed by the dominant views of 
elite and popular opinion in the US. Beyond these contradictions is the 
difficulty in adapting the social and political conditions of many Asian and 
African countries to these principles. For example, individualism conflicts 
with loyalty to the clan. A market economy is ill at ease with political 
systems based on personal patronage.  
Another contradiction in the Western variant of a global world order is 
postmodern culture. Alongside globalization, local cultures have become 
increasingly valued, with cultural diversity promoted and attempts to 
impose foreign norms opposed. This contradicts the trend of postmodern 
culture now popular in the West.  
In non-western countries, globalization can trigger conflicting 
movements for traditionalism (Huntington 2006 [1996]). “The higher the 
economic interdependence, the more pronounced the differences, 
especially linguistic ones. Globalization of the economy will be 
accompanied by the linguistic and cultural renaissance” (Naisbitt 2003 
[1982, 1984], 380). Protests against Western globalization have emerged in 
various forms and on different cultural levels. In the West, it goes as far as 
antiglobalist attacks on the McDonald’s chain of restaurants. In the 
Islamic world, traditionalism has spurred jihad against Western cultural 
expansion (Kazantsev 2003). 
Western civilization is first and foremost a coalition of highly effective 
European states and their former colonies (US, Canada, Australia). This 
coalition has a unitary civilizational foundation (Western Christianity), 
common history and culture rooted in Europe, and similar informal 
institutions (values of democracy, market economy, human rights, 
individualism, etc.). These countries are integrated through a number of 
very effective regional organizations, such as NATO, EU, ANZUS, and 
© TRACTUS AEVORUM  2 (2). Fall/Winter 2015 
 
181 
others. Many key international organizations (G8, IMF) are closely tied to 
their interests. Joining the coalition provides various benefits. Therefore, 
quite a few developed (Japan) and developing countries of different 
cultural-civilization foundations have forged close connections with it.  
At the same time, some rather powerful states (especially Russia, 
China, and Iran) are not parts of the coalition and only occasionally 
interact or compete with it. They officially advocate for a “multipolar 
world,” which may also be seen as a form of protest against political 
globalization. 
The key factor that will determine the evolution of the Western world 
in the long term is its demographic and economic decline. The former will 
be increasingly notable in comparison to rapidly growing states in Africa 
and Asia. The latter will require a relative reduction in the EU and US 
share of the global economy relative to China, India, and a number of 
countries in the Pacific Rim. 
However, this does not imply an overall decline of the Western world. 
There is no objective evidence to forecast this so far. Living standards will 
remain high in the Western countries. Even so, the United States and key 
EU states, being inferior to many Asian and African states in population 
and also lagging behind new economic giants (China in the first place) in 
GDP rates, will not be able to solve all the global problems on their own. 
Additionally, the West will be increasingly faced with the challenges 
posed by the incorporation of immigrants into the host society. As the 
demographic gap between the West and Asian and African countries 
widens, migration will only increase. The crisis of the multicultural model 
in the West makes the integration of such migrants particularly difficult. 
This cultural and civilizational problem already has important political and 
military dimensions, for example in the form of a large number of Muslim 
migrants who are ready to go to war with the West in Syria, Iraq, or 
Afghanistan, as well as the problem of increasing terrorist activity in the 
Western countries themselves. This cultural and civilizational tension will 
only grow with time as ways to solve it have not yet been found, and it is 
difficult to know if they will ever be found. 
Generally, the above preliminary analysis of local Western civilization 
development shows obvious decline in its unifying potential due to the 
influence of other civilizations. Therefore, it already points to one of the 
factors that provide relatively moderate norm unification in the twenty-first 
century globalization process. 
 
The Islamic world in the twenty-first century: developmental 
prospects 
Islam is a multifaceted religion with an enormous variety of 
dimensions, which has enriched humanity with great spiritual 
accomplishments. In terms of a specific Islamic civilization, for all its many 
faces it is possible to single out some general social, political, and 
psychological consequences that can arise due to a society’s position in the 
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Islamic world and, simultaneously, cause specific foreign policy challenges 
with non-Muslim partner countries (Kazantsev 2008). 
The famous orientalist and comparativist L. S. Vasil'ev noted that 
“Muslim countries were, as a rule, very powerful. Their unsophisticated 
internal administrative structure was usually characterized by simplicity 
and harmony. The effectiveness of the central government, based on the 
principle of power-ownership, the dominance of the state institutions, and 
taxation for the purpose of redistribution, was supported, as has often 
been mentioned, by the sacredness of government and the obedience of 
subjects” (Vasil'ev 2001, 184). As a result, all modern Islamic states are 
characterized by statism, paternalism, a bloated public sector, the 
inseparability of administrative authority and property ownership, and a 
low degree of economic freedom. These ‘anti-market’ trends are further 
strengthened by egalitarianism specific to the Islamic world, the idea of the 
equality of opportunity for all people and anti-elitism. As a result, mass 
movements in Islamic countries are, as a rule, anti-liberal. 
Equally characteristic of Islamic societies is a “sense of perfection in 
lifestyle, combined with the universality and comprehensiveness of Islam, 
which entangle the entire society like a thick web. This has always been 
the key to the extreme conservatism and conformism of Muslims, who are 
almost hourly (recall the obligatory five daily prayers) supposed to confirm 
their religious devotion” (Ibid.). This often leads to a high degree of 
conservatism, rejection of innovation, and a suspicious attitude toward 
any independent creative activity. This traditional structure creates a 
difficult situation in terms of modern innovations (Sergeev, Sarukhanian 
2012). An important role in the growth of conservative sentiment is played 
by “the closing of the gate of ijtihad” (i.e. the prohibition of independent, 
rational interpretation of the principles and norms of Islam) in the tenth 
century, a prohibition that is maintained to this day. 
Combined with the power of a paternalistic state and egalitarianism, 
the conservatism of the Islamic world leads to serious difficulties not only 
with the development of both an industrial and post-industrial economy. It 
is difficult to deny the fact that the economies of all Muslim societies are 
predominantly agricultural or resource-based. Trade and services are the 
only well developed modern sectors of the economy. The only exceptions to 
this rule are Malaysia and, to a certain extent, Turkey. However, Malaysian 
civilization lies within the Pacific Rim, and the Chinese minority plays a 
key role in its economic development. Turkey has, since the time of 
Ataturk, pursued a consistent deislamization in all spheres of life. 
It is difficult to refute the fact that the Islamic world resists the 
adoption of liberal democracy. More or less stable democracies were 
characteristic for two countries only: Turkey and Lebanon. Moreover, 
Turkey has experienced recurrent military coups and its army, in 
accordance with the precepts of Ataturk, considers itself the guardian of 
secular state development. Democracy in Lebanon was based on the 
predominant role of the Maronite Christians and has been destabilized by 
the growing influence of the Muslim population. 
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An important characteristic of traditional Islam is its belligerence and 
propensity for conflicts with the outside world. Of course, the mobilization 
potential of the religion is not often exercised in reality. Contrary to 
Western “clash of civilizations” misconceptions, the majority of Muslims in 
the world are neither extremists nor jihadists. Traditional Islamic 
understandings of the global community of believers (the Ummah) rarely 
endorse a “global caliphate.” Much more widespread among theologians 
and Islamic intellectuals is Islamic nationalism. Its supporters advocate 
the priority of Islam, but within the framework of nation-states. A 
contemporary interpretation that allows adaption of Islam to modern 
requirements has an even greater number of supporters in the Islamic 
world. Even among supporters of the global caliphate, many advocate for 
peaceful, educational means of struggle. In this case, it is a matter of 
integrating internal currents within Islamic society.  
However, almost all the trends in contemporary Islam include a search 
for alternative forms of political life and foreign policy to those in the West. 
This is true even for most Islamic modernists, who are often prone to the 
ideology of the third way: populism, social conservatism, statism, rejection 
of liberal democracy, and a free market. 
“The Islamic movement, whether moderately liberal or radical, is 
focused on the search for an ‘Islamic solution’ to contemporary issues, 
including political ones. However, the definition of an ‘Islamic solution’ 
differs among representatives of various political and social factions, and 
among ideologues and leaders, each with their own interpretation of 
Islamic truth. Still, they share a common desire to use the concept of a 
Muslim global community in politics, based on the idea that Islam is an 
integrated socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural system that 
opposes the expansion of the industrial Euro-American world. Today it 
takes the form of a movement for Islamic solidarity” (Levin 1999, 114). 
The “Islamic Alternative” is substantially represented in international 
political life. It can be seen in the alternative international organizations 
that exist throughout the Islamic world, with their own guiding principles, 
in contrast to the so-called Western (i.e. non-organic for the Islamic 
countries) system of international law and international relations 
(Ignatenko 2001, 8). Moreover, Islamic organizations have a clear tendency 
to duplicate Western global international organizations. The Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an analogue of the United Nations; The 
Islamic Commission of the International Red Crescent is an analogue of 
the International Red Cross; the Islamic Development Bank is an analogue 
of the IBRD; the Islamic Organization for Education, Science, and Culture 
is a UNESCO analogue; and the Sports Federation of Islamic Solidarity is 
an analogue of the World Olympic Committee. Key international 
documents also have alternative Islamic counterparts. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 
are one example. Another is the set of international instruments against 
terrorism in comparison to the Islamic instruments against international 
terrorism, the OIC, etc. (Ibid., 8–9). 
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In general, despite its contradictions, the Islamic world, like the West, 
is a coalition of states with a shared civilizational foundation. Its 
integration is due to a shared civilizational foundation, but also the 
presence of a large number of international governmental and non-
governmental organizations, and a widespread feeling of community and 
Islamic solidarity among the people. A perceptible token of the viability of 
such a large international coalition is the financial and economic aid that 
the rich (especially the oil-producing) Islamic countries give to the poorer 
ones. This aid is closely linked ideologically with various Islamic goals: 
Islamic education, Islamic solidarity, etc. Finally, a real indicator of the 
existence of an ‘Islamic Coalition’ in the world is that it supports its own 
version of a global order based on Islam (in spite of the diversity of 
interpretations of Islam). 
The twenty-first century will see all of the above characteristics of the 
world of Islam in place. It will continue the search for the “Islamic 
alternative” to Western-centric globalization. Continued population growth 
will lead to an enhanced relative role of the Islamic world on a global scale. 
However, the increase in population without a solid economic growth is 
also a challenge to the coalition’s development and even its stability. Along 
with population growth, the trend toward economic degradation will 
remain, since none of the states (with the partial exception of those located 
in the Pacific Rim, namely Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, and 
also Turkey, partially located in Europe) failed to fit into the post-industrial 
world and create an industrial economy. A possible reduction in the role of 
the hydrocarbon economy in the twenty-first century could lead to a sharp 
decrease in the significance of key Islamic countries, in particular Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. 
The second important trend for the Islamic world in the twenty-first 
century is a continued growth of religious extremism. This growth will 
persist as the economic backwardness of Islamic states and their 
overpopulation deepen. Religious extremism will define the dynamics of 
different kinds of serious conflicts, which will involve not only the Islamic 
countries, but also other regions of the world (Kazantsev 2002).  
The third trend is the continued high threat of failed states due to 
negative socio-economic factors, overpopulation, and the growth of Islamic 
extremism.  
The fourth trend is the internal fragmentation of the Islamic world and 
severe internal conflicts between different denominations within the 
Islamic religion, manifested both in the confrontation between states (for 
example, the current conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia) and in 
extremist and terrorist activities. 
In general, the above preliminary analysis of the local Islamic 
civilization development shows its serious potential to reject unification of 
norms in international relations. Moreover, the severity of internal conflicts 
within the Islamic world clearly demonstrates that the proliferation of 
norms, even within a group of countries that belong to the same tradition, 
faces serious problems. 
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The Asian Pacific and “Asianism” evolution in the twenty-first 
century: developmental prospects for a compound civilization 
Asianism (or Pan-Asianism) is quite a complex set of ideologies 
prevalent in the Asian part of the Pacific Rim and further west, including 
China and India (Levin 1999, 196). The unity of these peoples arose due to 
the formation of giant trade, cultural, and civilizational zones, linking all 
the countries of the region (influenced by Chinese Confucian culture, 
Indian Buddhism, Hinduism, and, most recently, Islam via India) before 
the Europeans arrived (Braudel 1992 [1979], 679). Cultural synthesis also 
occurred in the area. Moreover, movement toward closer cooperation came 
from both ends of Asia. Back in the time of Ming dynasty (1368-1644), 
prior to the European Age of Discovery, Chinese military and merchant 
fleets circumnavigated the whole of Asia, reaching Africa. On the other end 
of Asia, the same sea route was explored by Muslim traders from India and 
Southeast Asia, where the synthesis of Islamic and Hindu-Buddhist 
cultures had already taken place. 
European colonialists who began to dominate the sea routes in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries merely usurped preexisting trade systems 
and, to a lesser extent, cultural ties. At the same time, China remained the 
most economically developed part of the world almost until the Opium 
Wars (nineteenth century), after which this role ultimately went to 
England. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, all the 
countries within this huge region (except Japan, and also, to a certain 
extent, China and Thailand) had become European colonies, semi-colonies 
or dependent states. 
The ideology of Asian unity grew as a reaction to Japan's victory over 
Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Prior to this event, due to 
the influence of European stereotypes, the nations of this vast 
international region generally bought into Western notions of their own 
backwardness and even racial inferiority, and the need to completely 
abandon traditional values. However, the successful military and economic 
modernization of Japan and her victory over a great military power showed 
that Asian peoples (associated with the Mongoloid race) could effectively 
respond to the challenges of the modern world. Moreover, it turned out 
that many of the traditional institutions and values could well be preserved 
(as was the case in Japan). They could even be the basis of efficiency in 
competition with the Europeans. 
Within the anti-colonialist struggle, Asianism took on the slogan “Asia 
for the Asians.” This was in the spirit of many scientific and ideological 
ideas of the time, including European ones, to assume that Asian racial 
unity also implied the unity of values and cultures. A certain similarity 
was also seen between anti-colonial movements in Asia-Pacific and 
Japanese expansionism aimed at ousting Europeans from East Asia (in 
fact, a Japanese construct designed to emphasize the leadership of Japan 
in the region). Thus emerged elements of a cooperative coalition between 
Leonid Iu. Gusev, Andrey A. Kazantsev. The Evolution of Local Human Civilizations… 
 
186 
various Asian countries, a trend that survived and saw renewed relevance 
in the postwar period. 
Japan had done a lot for the birth of Asianism, but its war crimes 
during the war with China and World War II alienated it from other Asian 
countries. Nevertheless, Japan experienced a remarkable economic 
recovery after World War II that led to a change in the nature of Asianism. 
Along with various types of anticolonial sentiment, it also incorporated 
ideas of social and economic modernization, with reliance on traditional 
values and structures in its trade-investment cooperation with the West. 
Following Japan, there appeared new Asian “tigers” (Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea). They were followed by Malaysia and, to a 
lesser extent, Indonesia. Finally, as a result of the process of rapid 
economic growth after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, China regained the status 
of “the world’s workshop” in the 1990s. There has been a shift in the 
center of gravity of the global economy from North Atlantic to the Pacific 
Rim due to simultaneous economic growth in Asia-Pacific (especially 
China) and the US Pacific Coast. Moreover, there are even arguments that 
the United States and China are now “one economy with two different 
political systems.” Indeed, despite all the political controversy between the 
US and China, the degree of economic interdependence is quite high 
(China is the main creditor of the United States; the United States is the 
main investor and source of technology for China, and both countries are 
each other's key trading partners). All of these trends will mitigate any 
political-military confrontations between China and the United States in 
the twenty-first century. 
In the domain of political culture, the peoples of Asia-Pacific share 
pronounced pragmatism and the desire to maximize the potential of their 
traditional values for social and economic modernization. In terms of 
political systems, these countries are a rather mixed picture. 
Authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or post-communist regimes generally 
predominate. The region has very few democracies. While some of them are 
very young (South Korea, Taiwan), others are marked by specifically Asian 
features (such as the dominance of one party in Japan). This has led to the 
extreme popularity of a development model that combines successful 
development of a market economy with preservation of the existing, often 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, social and political institutions,. In 
this respect, the model developed in the Asian Pacific Rim, based on a 
combination of Westernization, democratization and economic 
liberalization, offers a viable alternative to the Western model of 
development in the twenty-first century. 
International cooperation in the region has become more and more 
grounded on the principle of “Asian affairs should be administered by 
Asians.” Thus, the countries of the region took responsibility for shaping 
their own structures of regional order, spurred on by attempts by Western 
countries to intervene in the process. This trend will continue in the 
twenty-first century, although during Obama’s presidency, it faced a new 
challenge: the American desire to establish a system of military-political 
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alliances around the periphery of China. However, this policy has met with 
resistance from China and pushback from many representatives of Asian 
political elites.  
This is evident, for example, in the various integration structures in 
the APR. The basis for integration in the region is Asian values as opposed 
to political pressure from the West. Often, it is officially proclaimed public 
policy. Thus, during the early 1980s, Malaysia officially declared a “focus 
on Asia” policy. Likewise, Singapore, while supporting immigration of 
highly qualified professionals from other countries, especially encouraged 
Asians, not Europeans to take advantage of this policy. In this particular 
case, Singapore authorities have consistently emphasized the role of Asian 
values in the functioning of the state political system. 
At the informal level, Asian countries also interact mainly and most 
comfortably with each other. Overall, despite some differences (such as 
territorial disputes and claims against Japan for the atrocities of the 
occupation), they have developed a very effective international coalition, 
the ranks of which are closed for the carriers of foreign values. For 
example, ASEAN rejected a proposal to establish a free trade area with 
neighboring Australia and New Zealand. “The question of a merger was 
withdrawn from the agenda since three leading members of ASEAN 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) refused to launch talks in 
October 2000, in large part because of dissatisfaction with repeated 
attempts by the Australian government to impose their worldview on these 
countries” (Tsyganov 2006). 
As the economic influence of Asia-Pacific countries, especially China, 
grows, their perception of the optimal structure of regional order based on 
Asian culture will begin to have a global impact. The most active countries 
in this respect are Malaysia and China. It is likely that this trend will 
continue for at least the first half of the twenty-first century. In this 
connection, an analysis of local civilizations in the Asia-Pacific Rim 
(civilizations of Sino-Confucian, Indian, Islamic and other traditions) shows 
that this region’s rise will lead to the formation of alternative cultural and 
civilizational standards to the Eurocentric world. In the long term, this 
development will also reduce the degree of unification of the norms within 
international relations and will also hamper the trend toward unification 
within the region. 
 
Conclusion 
In general, the above preliminary analysis of a number of local 
civilizations located on the periphery of Russia's borders shows that the 
rate of norm proliferation in international relations in the twenty-first 
century will be tempered by a number of factors. Among them are the 
following:  
1) an analysis of the dynamics of European and American 
development shows a clear decline in unifying potential based on the 
influence of the Western world on other local civilizations; 
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2) an analysis of local civilizations in the Asia-Pacific Rim (Sino-
Confucian, Indian, Islamic and other traditional civilizations) shows that 
this region’s rise will lead to the formation of alternative civilizational 
standards to the Eurocentric world. 
In the long run, these factors will reduce the degree of unification of 
norms in international relations. However, the question of whether it will 
lead to increased conflict and reduce the stability of international relations 
in accordance with the theory first put forward by Samuel Huntington 
(2006 [1996]), or alternatively, whether the system will provide the 
necessary stability for diversity, must be the subject of a separate analysis, 
as suggested in the framework of the Long-term Forecasting of 
International Relations Program implemented by the Center for Military 
and Political Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations of 
the Russian Foreign Ministry.  
 
Translated from Russian by Alexander M. Amatov 
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